John Pocock's edition of Burke's _Reflections_ is two classics in one: Burke's Reflections and Pocock's reflections on Burke and the eighteenth century.

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativism’s claim that the past must be re-described continuously from the perspective of the present to be the result of the following train of thought: 1) “all knowledge is conceptually mediated”; 2) “the conceptual framework through which knowledge of reality (...) is mediated changes with every new generation of historians”; therefore (narrativism’s claim) “the historical past changes with every new generation of historians”. The idea of an unchanging past, for the narrativist, requires denying premise 1 (all knowledge is conceptually mediated”) and therefore rests on a problematic commitment to the chimerical notion of the past as it is in-itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. We argue that the narrativist’s conclusion does not follow unless one adds a further premise, namely 3) “it is not possible to view reality through the categorial framework of historical agents”. If one asserts the possibility of grasping reality through the categorial framework of others, be they contemporary or past agents (as much philosophy of history written in an idealist key does), then one no longer has to accept the narrativist’s inference that since the past cannot be known in-itself or independently of conceptual mediation, then it cannot be known as it always was for the historical agents. Narrativism’s inference that the past cannot be known as it always was does not follow from premises 1 and 2 unless one smuggles in another problematic premise, premise 3. In this paper we defend the claim that the past can be known as it always was (not as it is in-itself) by invoking a different conception of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge, one which assumes the possibility of viewing reality through the categorial framework of others. This notion of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge is prevalent in the idealist tradition but, in the interest of brevity, we will defend this notion of mediacy by specific reference to the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (shrink)

In this paper an assessment will be made of the state of Business Ethics as an academic discipline as well as on the extent to which theory on Business Ethics has been translated into practice within the South African society. First the way in which Business Ethics is defined will be examined. Then the issues within the field of Business Ethics that is considered to be most important will be addressed, as well as the reasons why it is believed to (...) be important to address them. From there the attention will be shifted to the way in which Business Ethics has been institutionalised at tertiary education level. An overview of important initiatives taken by the business sector themselves will also be reviewed. Then co-operation between business and academia on Business Ethics will be discussed. Finally an assessment will be made of what can be learned from Business Ethics elsewhere in the world and what can be offered in this regard. Also some future prospects of Business Ethics in South Africa will be explored. (shrink)

La Philosophie de la Technique compte des centaoines de titres a l'etranger mais reste balbutiante en France. Or la technique constitue bien le milieu universel dans lequel desormais nous naissons, vivons et mourrons. Il n'est pas sur que cette technique englobante, qui innerve notre temps et notre espace, puisse encore etre consideree comme un ensemble d'outils au service de l'Homme et comme une science appliquee. L'Homme suivant toutes ses dimensions, est mis en question par la technique contemporaine. La science est (...) si essentiellement enchevetree a la technique, qui est operation (action et manipulation), qu'il n'y a plus de science pure, c'est-a-dire neutre et innocente. Voila pourquoi la Philosophie de la Technique rencontre la problematique ethique non de l'exterieur mais necessairement et essentiellement. Que dois-je faire? depend fondamentalement de ce que j'ai la capacite de faire. La technique, qui a radicalement modifie la nature et le champ du pouvoir-faire humain, individuel et collectif, exige du meme coup que la question ethique soit fondamentalement reconsideree. Ethique et Technique n'intervient donc pas comme un chapitre quelconque de la Philosophie de la Technique, mais peut-etre bien comme le coeur meme de ce nouveau champ de reflexion. (shrink)

This article reflects a conversation between Jan G. van der Watt and Stephan Joubert. The article serves as the introduction to the Special Collection: ‘From timely exegesis to contemporary ecclesiology: Relevant hermeneutics and provocative embodiment of faith in a Corona-defined world – Festschrift for Stephan Joubert, sub-edited by Willem Oliver ’. Following a brief bio-statement as introduction, the following issues are discussed: the collection for the Jerusalem church; relevance of theology for society; social-scientific exegesis; the ancient concept of grace; Bible (...) translation in South Africa; public theology on the electronic platform; biblical examples of leadership and electronic media in religious activities and education.Contribution: This Festschrift represents current trends in biblical scholarship and ecclesial leadership. It contributes to the public discourse in church and society, especially the role of the electronic media in current Fourth Industrial Revolution. (shrink)

In his recent book Waar geest is, is vrijheid [Where there is mind, there is freedom], Guus Labooy sets forth an original and intriguing argument, inspired by the work of John Duns Scotus, for substance dualism in the philosophy of mind. In this paper we argue that his argument, although worthy of serious attention, is under-supported. In section 2 we question the significance of the particular scotistic notion of freedom he uses in his argument, even though we agree with his (...) premise that humans do possess freedom in the libertarian sense. In section 3 we argue that Labooy fails to make his key contention that significant freedom requires an irreducible immaterial soul sufficiently plausible. The key problem is that he does not consider the work of physicalists who also believe in libertarian freedom. In addition, it is not self-evident that an immaterial soul, as opposed to a physical body, can possess significant freedom. This requires argument. In section 4 we comment on Labooy’s specific conception of dualism and advise him to change it into a conception in which the soul — and not the composition of soul and body — is the human person, for the latter conception has absurd consequences. (shrink)

Title: Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century BritainPublisher: University of Minnesota PressISBN: 0816660581Author: John W. YoltonTitle: Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to ReidPublisher: University of Minnesota PressISBN: 0816611629Author: John W. Yolton.